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Raz on the Right to Autonomy
N. Hassouni
Abstract:
In  The  Morality  of  Freedom, Joseph  Raz  argues  against  a  right  to  autonomy. This 
argument helps to distinguish his theory from his competitors’. For, many liberal theories 
ground such a right and some even start from an autonomy-based account of rights. This 
paper suggests that Raz's argument raises an important dilemma for his larger theory. 
Unless  his  account  of  rights  is  limited  in  some way,  Raz’s  argument  applies  against 
almost all (purported) rights, not just a right to autonomy. But, on the traditional way of 
limiting accounts  like his,  Raz’s account  actually  supports  the conclusion that  people 
have a right to autonomy. So, unless there is another way of limiting his account that does 
not  have  this  consequence,  Raz’s  argument  against  a  right  to  autonomy does  not  go 
through.
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Raz on the Right to Autonomy
I. Introduction
In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz argues against a right to autonomy.  This 
argument helps to distinguish his theory from his competitors’. For, many liberal theories 
ground such a right.ii Some even defend an entirely autonomy-based account of rights.iii 
This paper suggests, however, that Raz's argument raises an important dilemma for his 
larger theory. Unless his account of rights is limited in some way, Raz’s argument applies 
against almost all (purported) rights, not just a right to autonomy.  If Raz’s account is 
limited in the traditional  way,  however,  it  is not clear that his objection to a right to 
autonomy goes through. So, unless there is another way of limiting his account that does 
not  have  this  consequence,  Raz’s  argument  against  a  right  to  autonomy  should  be 
rejected.iv Section  II  sketches  Raz’s  account  of  autonomy.  Section  III  considers  his 
argument for the conclusion that people lack a right to autonomy. Section IV critiques 
this argument. Section V concludes.
II. Autonomy
Autonomy  is  often  equated  with  individuality,  freedom of  the  will,  integrity, 
independence,  self-knowledge,  responsibility,  freedom from obligation,  self-assertion, 
critical  reflection,  and  absence  of  external  causation.v Despite  their  diversity,  most 
accounts of autonomy have this in common: People must freely shape their lives.vi As 
Raz puts it:
If a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have the 
mental abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan 
their  execution.  These  include  minimum  rationality,  the  ability  to 
comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties 
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necessary to plan actions, etc. For a person to enjoy an autonomous life he 
must actually use these faculties to choose what life to have. There must in 
other words be adequate options available for him to choose from. Finally, 
his choice must be free from coercion and manipulation by others, he must 
be independent.vii
In other words, to secure autonomy, people must be able to reason about, make and carry 
out some simple and some significant plans on the basis of their beliefs, values, desires, 
and goals (henceforth  commitments). They must also have good options from which to 
choose  and  be  free  from  coercion  and  manipulation.  Let  us  consider  each  of  these 
conditions for autonomy in turn.
First, what does it mean to say that one must be able to reason on the basis of 
one's  commitments?  The  idea  is  just  this:  Autonomous  people  must  have  some 
instrumental  reasoning  ability.  Some  hold  much  more  demanding  conceptions  of 
rationality  on  which  saying  that  autonomy  requires  the  ability  to  reason  would  be 
controversial. Kant, for instance, thinks that reason requires each of us to acknowledge 
the categorical imperative as unconditionally required.viii The rationality component of 
autonomy at issue does not require this much, however. People need only have the ability 
to do some instrumental reasoning.
Next,  consider  what  it  means  to  say  that  one  must  be  able  to  make  some 
significant plans on the basis of one's commitments. To make significant plans one need 
not  plan  one’s  whole  life  or  every detail  of  one’s  day.  Rather,  one  must  be  able  to 
navigate through one’s day with ease and make general plans for the future. One must not 
be, like Raz’s proverbial man in a pit or hounded woman, limited to making plans only 
about how to meet one’s needs.ix Though one might not choose to exercise this ability, 
one must have the planning ability necessary to pursue the projects one values; to pursue 
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a  good life  as  one  sees  it.  This  ability  requires  a  kind  of  internal  freedom.  Internal 
freedom is roughly the capacity to decide “for oneself what is worth doing,” one must be 
able to make “the decisions of a normative agent”; to recognize and respond to value as 
one sees it.x One must be able to form some simple and significant plans that would work 
if implemented. One must be able to make some simple and significant plans that one 
could carry through if free from external constraint.xi
To carry out some simple and significant plans one must have some external as 
well  as  internal  freedom.xii External  freedom,  or  liberty,  is  roughly  freedom  from 
interference to pursue a “worthwhile life.”xiii A woman who can think for herself may 
have internal freedom even if she lacks external freedom because she is imprisoned. To 
carry  out  some  simple  and  significant  plans  one  must  have  enough  freedom  from 
coercion and constraint to carry out those actions necessary to bring some valuable plans 
to fruition. The importance of the qualifier some is just this: One need not be able to carry 
out  every valuable  plan that  one might  want  to carry out  to  have this  component  of 
autonomy. Still, the ability to carry out some simple and significant plans is a necessary 
component of this kind of autonomy.
The idea that people must be able to reason about, make and carry out both some 
simple and some significant plans free from coercion and constraint is tied to the idea that 
they must have good options. Variety matters as well as number. People must be able to 
“exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to 
decline to develop any of them.”xiv They must be able to move bodies, sense the world, 
use their imagination and affection, and occupy their minds. People lack good options if 
all of their choices are dictated by others or circumstances. They must not be paralyzed or 
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chained, coerced, or manipulated. Their decisions must not be determined beforehand by 
the dictate to maintain their lives. A singer threatened with the loss of her voice if she 
does  anything another  dislikes,  for instance,  is  not  autonomous.  All  of one’s  options 
cannot  have horrendous effects.  On the  other  hand, one’s  acting on one’s significant 
options must at least sometimes have significant effects. If one fails in everything one 
tries to accomplish,  one is not autonomous.  Though, one need not fully realize one’s 
valuable  capacities  to  be  autonomous,  one  must  be  able  to  choose  or  reject  self-
realization. 
Raz also says that to have good options people must have many collective goods, 
goods that are inherently public (i.e. non-contingently non-excludable).xv The provision 
of  such  goods  requires  others  to  bear  “potentially  burdensome  duties,  regarding 
fundamental  aspects  of  their  lives.”xvi He suggests that  “autonomy is  possible  only if 
various collective goods are available.”xvii 
The  opportunity  to  form  a  family  of  one  kind  or  another,  to  forge 
friendships, to pursue many of the skills, professions and occupations, to 
enjoy fiction,  poetry,  and the  arts,  to  engage in  many of  the  common 
leisure activities: these and others require an appropriate common culture 
to make them possible and valuable.xviii
Raz argues, however, that autonomy “can be pursued in different societies which vary 
considerably in the other aspects of the pursuits and opportunities which they afford their 
members.”xix 
Autonomy is, to be sure,  inconsistent  with various alternative forms of 
valuable lives. It cannot be obtained within societies which support social 
forms which do not leave enough room for individual choice.  But it is 
compatible with any valuable set of social forms which conforms with the 
general conditions specified above.xx
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It  is  not  entirely  clear  what  Raz  intends  to  indicate  by  “general  conditions.”  xxi He 
probably  means  “any valuable  set  of  social  forms”  which  support  the  capacities  for 
autonomy sketched above by, for example, providing the requisite collective goods.xxii It 
is  clear  that  Raz  thinks  societies  can  be  structured  in  many  different  ways  and  still 
provide their members with good options. Good options require good social structures, 
but there are many good social structures that can provide these options.
III. Raz’s Argument Against a Right to Autonomy
Raz’s believes that people do not have a right to autonomy. This does not mean 
there are no rights grounded in the interest in leading an autonomous life. Rather, he 
holds that there is no right to autonomy simpliciter. Raz believes only some of the duties 
we have  to  protect  autonomy are  grounded in  rights.  He thinks  there  are  reasons  to 
protect  individuals’  interests  in  living  autonomously that  are  not  rights-based;  rights-
based duties do not exhaust the range of duties grounded in autonomy. 
Raz believes the conclusion that our reasons for protecting autonomy are not fully 
grounded in a set of rights-based duties demonstrates that liberalism cannot be grounded 
entirely  in  a  rights-based  morality.  This  is  significant  since  Ronald  Dworkin,  John 
Mackie, and others have suggested that political morality might be “rights-based.”xxiii Raz 
thinks rights do not have such a foundational role in morality. 
This paper will  not question Raz’s larger conclusion that liberalism cannot  be 
grounded entirely in a rights-based morality. Rather, its primary aim is to question Raz’s 
claim that there is no right to autonomy. It will argue that, on the most plausible way of 
constraining Raz’s account, people only have rights to standard protections of autonomy. 
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If Raz’s account is constrained in this way, however, Raz provides no objection to the 
conclusion that there is a right to autonomy. 
Perhaps  this  paper’s  argument  can  be  extended  to  undercut  Raz’s  larger 
conclusion. For, one could argue in a similar way that we only have duties to provide 
standard protections of others’ interests and, on the standard way of constraining Raz’s 
account of rights, rights provide exactly these protections. It might follow that rights are 
the  appropriate  foundation  for  liberalism.  Perhaps  this  argument  merits  further 
exploration.
The claim that there is no right to autonomy is significant, however, whether or 
not Raz’s larger conclusion about the role of rights in morality is correct. For, authors 
like James Griffin have recently tried to give accounts  of rights grounded entirely in 
agency (which is akin to what Raz calls autonomy).xxiv On such account people have a 
right to everything which protects autonomy. So whether or not Raz’s argument against a 
right to autonomy goes through is significant on its own. In any case, this paper will just 
consider this component of his larger argument.
Raz’s argument against a right to autonomy starts from his account of rights. On 
Raz’s account, “‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some 
other person(s) to be under a duty.”xxv Then, Raz says:
A right to autonomy can be had only if  the interest  of the right-holder 
justified holding members of the society at large to be duty-bound to him 
to provide him with the social environment necessary to give him a chance 
to  have  an  autonomous  life.  Assuming  that  the  interest  of  one  person 
cannot justify holding so many to be subject to potentially burdensome 
duties, regarding such fundamental aspects of their lives, it follows that 
there is no right to personal autonomy.xxvi
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Or, to “put it another way: a person may be denied the chance to have an autonomous 
life, through the working of social institutions and by individual action, without any of 
his rights being overridden or violated.”xxvii Raz believes people do not have rights-based 
duties to provide all of the collective goods necessary for autonomy, though these goods 
are intrinsically valuable. For, more generally,  Raz seems to think people do not have 
rights with potentially burdensome correlative duties to provide collective goods.xxviii
Raz considers one objection to his argument against a right to autonomy. Namely, 
that it is implausible to think that all rights must be justified by right-holders’ interests, 
“the value placed on that interest may derive from its usefulness to others.”xxix That is an 
individual  may have a right not because having that right protects  that individual but 
because having that right protects other individuals. On this view, the right of a journalist 
to free speech might be grounded in part in the interests of others in living in a liberal  
democracy  protected  by this  right.  Even  if  the  journalist  did  not  have  an  interest  in 
speaking freely, others have an interest in her having a right to such speech. 
To put the objection another way, one might reject Raz’s argument by rejecting 
the idea that rights are justified by right-holders’ interests. For, one could argue that the 
distinction between a right being “justified by the service it does to the interest of the 
right-holder”  and “the value  placed on that  interest”  deriving  “from its  usefulness  to 
others” is too fine.xxx  If individuals’ interests are inextricably intertwined, it may make 
little sense to justify rights only in terms of individual interests. Does it make sense to say 
that a parent has a right to food only because of the parent’s interest in food but not 
because the parent will be better able to care for her child if the parent is well-nourished? 
It might not if the parent has an interest in her child’s welfare.
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Raz rejects this move. He believes the distinction between a right being “justified 
by the service it does to the interest of the right-holder” and “the value placed on that 
interest” deriving “from its usefulness to others” is necessary.xxxi He says: 
Consider the consequences of dispensing with it. Dispensing with it would 
mean, for example, that each member of a nation has a right to the self-
determination of the nation. It is his personal right. It would also mean that 
as each of us has an interest in an environment in which promises are kept 
and people do not deceive each other, I, as well as everyone else, have a 
right  that  you shall  keep your  promises  and that  you shall  not deceive 
other people.xxxii
Raz says  we should not  reject  the idea that  rights  must  be justified  by right-holders’ 
interests. So he concludes that there is no right to autonomy because individuals’ interests 
in autonomy cannot justify the imposition of duties correlative to such a right. Again, 
Raz’s conclusion is not that there is no duty to protect autonomy. Rather, it is that there is 
no rights-based duty to protect autonomy.
IV. Rejecting Raz’s Argument Against a Right to Autonomy
There  are  a few quick responses  to  Raz’s argument.  One might,  for instance, 
adopt a line Jeremy Waldron advocates.xxxiii Waldron suggests that the duties correlative 
to individual rights may not individually be strong enough to require anyone to attempt 
institutional reform. Collectively, however, he says these duties may be strong enough 
that some individuals must try to bring about such reform. This does not mean that the 
duty bearers owe the attempt to bring about reform to a collectivity (society or humanity). 
Nor does this  mean the duty bearers owe the attempt to bring about  reform to other 
individuals besides the rights holders. Rather, this idea is compatible with all rights being 
grounded in rights-holder’s  interests.  Though,  individuals  would have  some rights  to 
collective goods.
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Even  setting  these  points  aside,  however,  Raz's  argument  against  a  right  to 
autonomy faces an important dilemma. On the one hand, unless his account of rights is 
limited in some way, Raz’s argument applies against almost all rights, not just a right to 
autonomy. On the other hand, if Raz’s account is limited in the traditional way, it is not 
clear that his objection to a right to autonomy goes through.
Consider the first horn of this dilemma. Unless Raz’s account of rights is limited 
in some way, his argument applies against almost all (purported) rights, not just a right to 
autonomy. For, if the duties correlative to many such rights are not limited in some way, 
they will  require the demanding provision of collective goods. Raz’s argument would 
show that  no one has a duty derived only from rights  grounded in each individual’s 
interests  to  ensure  that  individuals  can  secure  adequate  health  care,  for  instance.  He 
would have to say some medical care requires institutional change that is too expensive to 
be guaranteed for all as a matter of right. Nor would people have a duty derived only 
from rights grounded in each individual’s interests to ensure that everyone else’s right to 
free movement or even life is secure. A decent legal system with adequate police forces 
and a culture of respect are necessary to protect these rights. It may be better to say that 
people must  only do their  part  in  providing standard protections  of others’ important 
interests, for instance. For it is not clear that Raz’s argument tells against most rights if 
the correlative duties only require others to do their part in providing standard protections 
of each individual’s interests. At least Raz’s account of rights should be limited in some 
way. 
If Raz’s account is limited in the traditional way, however, it is not clear that his 
objection to a right to autonomy goes through. For, on the traditional way of limiting 
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rights, not every interest which grounds a duty grounds an unlimited duty.xxxiv And, Raz’s 
argument just shows that people do not have a right to autonomy that generates unlimited 
duties. 
Suppose, for instance, we modify Raz’s analysis of rights slightly as follows: “‘X 
has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of 
X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be 
under a duty” to provide standard protections of this interest.xxxv There are, of course, 
many different ways of filling out the standard protections clause in this kind of account. 
Sometimes  people  may  have  to  bear  very  significant  burdens  to  fulfill  the  duties 
correlative to others’ rights. Sometimes, for instance, people may have to give up their 
lives to avoid violating others’ rights to life. But this kind of account has the resources to 
limit the demands rights can generate. 
On this way of understanding Raz’s account there is no problem with a right to 
autonomy.  Raz’s  argument  does  not  challenge  the  claim  that  the  importance  of  an 
individual’s interest in living an autonomous life can ground rights with correlative duties 
to provide standard protections of this interest. Raz worried that an individual’s interest 
in autonomy, no matter how great, could not justify holding “members of the society at 
large to be duty-bound to him to provide him with the social environment necessary to 
give  him a chance  to  have  an autonomous  life.”xxxvi Providing standard protection  of 
individuals’ autonomy may not require imposing burdensome duties on many others.xxxvii 
So Raz’s argument may provide no objection to a right to autonomy.
Although Raz suggests that one needs many particular options (e.g. the option of 
monogamous  marriage)  to  be  autonomous,  this  does  not  follow from his  account  of 
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autonomy.  After  all,  Raz allows that  a variety of institutional  structures may support 
autonomy.xxxviii It  is  unfair,  but  individuals  can still  be  autonomous  under  institutions 
allowing monogamous marriages for some and domestic partnerships for others.xxxix
Of course, providing any institutional structure (or other collective goods) does 
require  assigning some duties.  Some may even have  to  bear  great  burdens  to  create 
institutions like marriage.
But it is not like we are starting in the absence of any institutions whatsoever. In 
some cases, only a few legal changes may be necessary to protect individuals’ autonomy 
against the most common threats. Even if the option of monogamous marriage is required 
for autonomy, for instance, most societies would only need to make a few legal changes 
to extend this option universally. 
Providing standard protections of everyone’s autonomy may not require any more 
than providing standard protections of everyone’s other rights (e.g. to security) even if 
significant institutional change is required. Providing standard protections of autonomy 
might  require  implementing  new  health  or  education  programs.  Providing  standard 
protections of security might require implementing new police or military programs. The 
police and military programs may be more expensive or difficult to implement than the 
health and education programs.
The obligations correlative to a right to autonomy might, for instance, be like the 
obligations correlative to other (e.g. human) rights. On the standard picture:
(1) governments are the primary addressees of the human rights of their residents, 
with duties both to respect and to uphold their human rights;  (2) governments 
have  negative  duties  to  respect  the  rights  of  people  from other  countries;  (3) 
individuals have negative responsibilities to respect the human rights of people at 
home and abroad; (4) individuals have responsibilities as voters and citizens to 
promote human rights in their own country; and (5) governments, international 
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organizations and individuals have back-up responsibilities for the fulfillment of 
human rights around the world.xl
At least on an account like this, individuals need only refrain from violating rights and do 
their  part  in  bringing  about  decent  institutional  structures  that  protect  rights.  So, 
individuals might just have to refrain from violating others’ right to autonomy and vote 
for autonomy-enabling institutional structures. The idea is not that I have to provide some 
of the goods necessary for autonomy –e.g. the opportunity to marry (me?!) and you have 
to provide others. Rather, the idea is that each of us has to do our part in creating the 
social conditions in which individuals’ rights are secure. Normally,  these duties would 
not be very onerous.  
Perhaps Raz could accept the conclusion that rights must be limited in some way 
and even this conception of the duties correlative to rights, but insist that there are further 
duties grounded in autonomy that  are not rights-based. He could argue that  there are 
duties to provide the collective goods necessary to support autonomy that are inconsistent 
with the rights-based conception of morality. That is, he could insist that there are non-
rights-based obligations to provide non-standard protections of autonomy. Perhaps it is 
the interests of large numbers of people in autonomy, rather than their rights, that grounds 
duties  to  maintain  social  institutions  and  other  collective  goods.  This  would  let  Raz 
maintain that there is more to morality than protecting rights. He could also argue that 
once rights-based duties to protect other interests (e.g. in health) are fulfilled, there are 
still duties to protect these interests. He only needs to defend the idea that there is a gap 
between rights-based duties and what morality requires of us to show that there is more to 
morality than protecting rights.
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Even  if  one  of  these  moves  works  and Raz’s  larger  polemical  aim succeeds, 
however, the above arguments suggest Raz would have to give up something important. 
For,  if  the  arguments  in  this  section  are  correct,  it  is  not  clear  that  autonomy-based 
accounts of rights fail. And, as noted above, the question of whether there is a right to 
autonomy is independently important in light of other authors’ attempts to ground rights 
in autonomy (as some of these authors suggest people have a right to whatever they need 
to secure autonomy).xli Furthermore, this section’s arguments give one reason to wonder 
whether there is any duty to provide non-standard protections of autonomy. Reflect again 
on  the  vast  amount  of  resources  that  might  be  required  to  protect  some individuals’ 
autonomy (or health etc.). One might argue that no one has any duty at all to provide 
these things for others; people only have a duty to help provide standard protections of 
others’ interests, including others’ interests in autonomy.
V. Objections
Perhaps, one could argue, Raz is not objecting to how demanding it is to provide 
collective goods, but to the mere possibility that rights could require the provision of 
goods  like  this.  For,  he  says  the  provision  of  collective  goods  is  only  potentially 
demanding, while this provision necessarily impinges on the lives of many members of a 
society. The objection would just be this: “How is it possible for an individual to have a 
right to something which will  impact the lives of many others?” Perhaps this is what 
lends intuitive force to Raz’s claim that no one has a (personal) right to national self-
determination.xlii He might insist that no single individual has a right to something when 
many others will be impacted by fulfilling the duties correlative to that right, even if none 
of them would be subject to demanding duties.xliii 
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Although Raz’s example is compelling, that may only be because individuals do 
not  have  a  basic  interest  in  national-self-determination  (despite  Raz’s  claim  to  the 
contrary in his paper “National Self-Determination” with Avishai Margalit).xliv It should 
be at  least  as intuitive,  however,  that there are many rights whose provision requires 
collective goods. We have seen that the right to a health and life require this much, for 
instance. So do rights to a decent standard of living and physical security.  Individuals 
need a social system that protects these rights. Such a system may impinge on a great 
number  of  other  people’s  lives.  That  is  no  objection  to  these  (appropriately  limited) 
rights’  existence  especially if  it  is  not  too  demanding  to  fulfill  them.  Everyone  is 
obligated to vote for standard protections against physical violence, for instance, even if 
such protections only help very small minority groups avoid persecution.
Alternately,  one could deny that any rights should be limited and suggest that 
rights  are  absolute  (though Raz denies  this).xlv If  saying there is  a  right  to  autonomy 
would require weakening the very notion of a right, one could argue, that is reason to 
think there is no right to autonomy. If rights only require standard protections, the fact 
that someone has a right does not generate an all-things-considered duty to protect the 
right. One might object that this is implausible; it  is better to say that there is just an 
imperfect duty to promote autonomy.xlvi
This  suggestion  rejects  the  proposed  solution  to  Raz’s  dilemma  too  quickly. 
Rights might generate all-things-considered duties to do whatever constitutes a standard 
protection of individuals’ interests. So it is not clear that this limit poses a problem for 
Raz’s account of rights, even if Raz’s claim that rights are not absolute is wrong. 
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Even if one does not like proposed method of dealing with Raz’s dilemma, that 
does not justify accepting the unintuitive consequences of maintaining his account  of 
rights. Unless his account is limited in some way, Raz cannot say people have a right to 
bodily security or health. Unless his account is limited, people do not even have a basic 
right to life.  For, such unlimited rights would be too demanding, generating duties to 
provide anything and everything a  person needs  to secure the objects  of these rights 
(including  incredibly  expensive  medical  care).  So,  unless  the  objector  can  provide 
another way of limiting Raz’s account (I have no other ideas about how to limit it), his 
account cannot support even these basic rights. That is much more implausible than the 
idea that rights are not absolute.
Perhaps one could argue that, even if his account of rights is not limited, Raz’s 
account  would  yield  some  rights.  Promises,  for  instance,  might  generate  rights  to 
whatever  is  necessary to  protect  their  beneficiaries’  interest(s)  in  having the  relevant 
promises fulfilled. 
Even  the  duties  promises  generate  can  be  excessively  demanding,  however. 
Because I am your friend I might promise to do whatever is necessary to protect you from 
a neighborhood bully who blackens peoples’ eyes. That would normally require me to 
offer such protection even if doing so requires me to take the black eye on your behalf. If  
I must choose between protecting your eye and the life of my child, however, it may be 
acceptable for me to break my promise to you. If I must give up everything I have earned 
to  protect  you  from  a  blackened  eye  I  may  likewise  be  relieved  of  my  obligation. 
Fulfilling promises might even require the demanding provision of collective goods.
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In any case, this response does not fully appreciate the problem Raz’s argument 
against a right to autonomy raises for his account of rights. The problem is not that there 
would be no rights on Raz’s account. The problem is that, if his account of rights is not 
limited, many of the things commonly supposed to be rights will not qualify as rights. So, 
if one is going to reject the proposed way of limiting Raz’s account, it is only fair to 
provide an alternative that does not have this consequence. For, it is better to admit that 
Raz’s argument  against  a right to autonomy does not go through than to endorse his 
account without limiting it.  Otherwise one will be unable to account for many of the 
things most commonly supposed to be rights. 
Let me put the point another way. If one accepts Raz’s argument against a right to 
autonomy, then one has to provide an alternative way of limiting his account or agree that 
Raz’s account fails to accommodate many of the things most commonly thought to be 
rights. For, without some way of limiting his account, it is easy to adapt his argument 
against  a right to autonomy so that it  applies quite broadly.xlvii It is more plausible to 
believe there is a right to autonomy, however, than to accept the view that many of the 
things most commonly thought to be rights are not rights. This last point is especially 
compelling if,  as this paper has argued, it is at least as easy to modify institutions to 
protect autonomy as it is to modify them to protect security, health, life and so forth. So, 
unless there is another way of avoiding Raz’s dilemma, one should reject his argument 
against a right to autonomy. 
Finally, one might argue that, even if Raz’s account of rights is not limited, it can 
capture all of the rights that matter. One might suggest, for instance, that there should 
only be rights to components of autonomy, not to autonomy simpliciter. Autonomy is, 
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after  all,  a  rather  complex  thing.  Furthermore,  many  existing  rights  already  protect 
elements of autonomy. So, one might object that an account on which there is a right to 
autonomy multiplies rights beyond necessity.xlviii
It  is  not  at  all  clear  that  Raz’s  account  protects  autonomy  by  protecting  its 
components. First, people have independent interests in having some of the components 
of autonomy. Everyone has an interest in being able to reason, for instance. People may 
not have independent interests in other components of autonomy, however. People may, 
for instance, only have interests in having good options from which to choose if they can 
choose.  Second,  it  is  hard  to  see  how protecting  a  right  to  autonomy would  be  too 
demanding,  while  protecting rights to all  the components  of autonomy would not be. 
Third, a right to all of the components of autonomy might amount to a right to autonomy 
if  protecting  the  components  protects  individuals’  autonomy.xlix Finally,  even  if  this 
strategy works with respect to the right to autonomy, that would not address the heart of 
the problem Raz’s argument against a right to autonomy raises for his account. The heart 
of  the  problem  is  that,  unless  Raz’s  account  of  rights  is  limited  in  some  way,  his 
argument  against  a  right  to  autonomy  may  apply  to  many  of  the  things  standardly 
characterized  as  rights.  The duties  correlative  to  many  of the  things  most  commonly 
considered rights may generate demanding duties to provide collective goods. At least 
more argument is necessary to explain how the objects of all of the things standardly 
characterized  as  rights  are  protected  by  rights  to  the  components  of  the  interests 
underlying them. 
Perhaps one could argue that it  would not embarrass Raz’s argument against a 
right to autonomy if it  applied against many of the things standardly characterized as 
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rights. For, the fact that there are no (narrowly) correlative duties based on rights does not 
mean that there are no (broadly) correlative duties that are not based on rights but directly 
upon the interests the relevant rights themselves are supposed to serve. Even if a duty is 
too demanding to be narrowly correlative, it might be broadly correlative. There may be 
duties  to  protect  others’  health,  for  instance,  even  if  no  one  has  a  right  to  these 
protections. 
Once again, it may be true that there are duties to protect interests not based on 
rights, but this move does not address the problem. There is clearly room for debate about 
whether some of the things people have claimed are rights are genuine rights. It is also 
permissible for Raz to use the word “rights” in any way he likes. Raz cannot, however,  
engage in debates about whether there is a right to autonomy in the standard sense of 
“right”  using  a  different  definition  that  does  not  even  capture  the  things  commonly 
supposed to be rights. In doing so, he would simply fail to engage with his interlocutor’s 
arguments.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has criticized Raz’s important argument against a right to autonomy. 
Raz suggests that one needs many particular options to secure autonomy. This, however, 
does not follow from his account. Even if people do need collective goods and these 
options, in particular,  it  might be easy to modify many existing societies so that they 
ensure that people have them. At least it may be just as easy to modify institutions to 
protect autonomy as it is to modify them to protect security, health, life and so forth. So 
Raz's argument against a right to autonomy raises an important dilemma for his larger 
theory. The rights Raz relies upon must be limited in some way if he is to account for 
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many of the things standardly characterized as rights. On the traditional way of limiting 
such rights, however, Raz’s account supports the conclusion that people have a right to 
autonomy. So unless those who want to defend Raz’s argument against such a right can 
provide another way of limiting his account, he must accept the incredibly implausible 
consequence that there are few, if any rights. It is better to reject Raz’s argument against 
a right to autonomy.l 
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